In his first treatise in On The Genealogy of Morality, Nietzsche is chiefly concerned with the evolutionary progression and valuation of morality. He begins his discourse by distinguishing between two competing sets of morality. The first being that of the “noble, powerful, higher ranking, and high minded who felt and ranked themselves and their doing as good,” (i.e. aristocratic/knightly morality), (p 908). Opposed to this system of goodness, Nietzsche elaborates and heaps much criticism against the so called priest-slave morality. This morality has its origins in the hate and powerlessness of a down trodden priestly caste, who being socially and politically weak, finds its sole recourse in perverting the noble system, by revaluing that which is good and bad. Instead of power, vigour, and vitality being the order of the day, Nietzsche argues that modern moral objectivity and pre-eminence is given to the weak, who label all noble things as evil and revalue the world so that “the miserable alone are good; the poor, powerless, lowly alone are good,” (p.912). Through subjugating the will to power to a higher imposed spiritual authority (God), men become enslaved to a passive, un-egoist paradigm which has its germination in “unfathomable hate” (p.912).
It follows, that from this inversion of the noble system there arises in the modern world a torpid state of being, in which mankind has become dull in most aspects. The weak being fearful of the powerful, and having inverted moral value to preach the “goodness” of equality have succeeded in reducing the human experience to something which is, “thinner, more good-natured, more prudent, more comfortable, more mediocre, and more apathetic,” (918). Nietzsche saw this phenomenon as the downward spiral of human degeneration. Having levelled the proverbial playing field and making all men equal, the slave mindset has succeeded in eliminating all of the nobility of mankind. In the modern world the consequences of this trend in mediocrity have manifested in having “forfeited the love of him [man], the reverence toward him, the hope for him, indeed the will to him” (918). It is from this that Nietzsche, a long time opponent to nihilism defines that philosophy simply as that “we are tired of man…” (918). Having thus established the philosophic outcome of slave morality on society (nihilism), Nietzsche turns to allegory to clarify “good” as defined by ressentiment.
Using anthropomorphic licence, Nietzsche brings home his argument by giving the reader the example of the lambs and the birds of prey (Section 13). In this, Nietzsche presents two opposing parties: 1) the birds of prey, who represent strength and nobility and 2) the lambs, who illustrate the herd. The lambs, being weak and dominated by their fear and hatred, naturally label the birds of prey as “evil.” Nietzsche does not argue this point, and sees it as a rational reaction. His criticism comes in when the lambs use this argument to reproach the predators. It is absurd in the Nietzschean argument for the lambs to “hold the birds of prey accountable for being birds of prey” (919). He further uses language as a medium for this argument. In this tangent, he states that the common people have placed meaning by separating subjects from their actions. He uses lightning as an example: “for just as common people separate lightning from its flash, the latter as a doing, as an effect of a subject of lightning, so does modern morality separate strength from the expression of strength.” (919). For Nietzsche the action of killing the lambs by the birds of prey, is their “expression of strength,” and by separating the action from the subject, common morality has led us to the conclusion that the predators are free to choose. In essence, the lambs have shaped language and morality in such a way as to make the bird immoral and evil by simple virtue of their existence.
Throughout the rest of the first treatise, the Nietzschean dialogue continues along this vein, illustrating the pervading consequences of slave morality. For example in the 14th section, he illustrates the advent of justice as a fabrication of the slaves in which the weak do not avenge themselves, but seek to have patience, “which is called virtue itself, not being able to avenge oneself perhaps even forgiveness,” (920). Instead, the slave moralists all but abandon Earthly justice and look to a fictional “Last Judgment,” in which God will restore justice by punishing evil (nobility). In the closing of this part of treatise one, Nietzsche compels us to seek the resurgence of the master morality.
The second treatise “Guilt, Bad Conscience, and Related Matters,” is an exploration on the social ramifications that morality has been used to bind humanity. Nietzsche opens with stating that in order for society to function, men must enter into competent promises, the terms of which they can deliver. A keen memory and intellect, able to remember the promise is essential, and that one must be on guard for “forgetfulness is no mere vis inertiae as the superficial believe; rather it is an active and in the strictest sense positive faculty of suppression,” (925). To keep a promise, Nietzsche argues men require a powerful memory and a confidence that the terms of their promises will be carried out.
In the following sections of the text, Nietzsche, elaborates on the concepts and origins of guilt and the bad conscience. Through questions aimed at the reader and his own suppositions, Nietzsche begins by stating that punishment in the barbaric cultures consisted of retribution meted out in anger over an injury suffered (i.e. broken promises or debts owed) (928), and that guilt in the modern moral sense was not at the base. Indeed, the torturous penalties levied by older cultures served as the “most powerful aid of mnemonics” (927), in short, pain forces men to remember their promises. Guilt and the bad conscious arose when men began to consider their natural inclinations as sinful and the notion of free will appeared. Men choose to be guilty and are therefore punished, not because they owe a debt, but because they should have acted in a way which makes them differ from the herd. Nietzsche goes on to say that the ancient world was much more but that at the same time it was far more “cheerful” because “seeing-suffer feels good, making-suffer even more so” (930). In such a world, there could be no debt between creditor and debtor that did not go unpaid, the latter was punished by the former and the rest was settled. People therefore didn’t spend the majority of their time as modern men do, constantly feeling as if they are being judged and watched. Bad conscious is thus a modern-slave ideal welded to the concept of conformity to the prevailing morality.
Sections 7-15 (pp.930-939), are dedicated to further explaining the evolution of punishment and justice. Nietzsche begins by stating that the more powerful a community becomes, the less likely it is to severely punish offenders as the offence given is not as dangerous to the collective whole as before. Over time however, “the evil doer is no longer made an outlaw and cast out; the general anger is no longer allowed to vent itself” (933). The creditors to whom retribution is owed become more and more lenient and ever richer, until they reach a stage in which point they overcome the need for strict punishment. The result is a “cancellation of justice” and this suspension of harsh retribution is prettily called “mercy” (933). In the Nietzschean evolution, justice is discovered last by the “reactive” slave society. This is due to ressentiment’s holding the avenging impulses of the wronged party at bay and demanding the protection of the rights of the accused. Nietzsche states that people of ressentiment are self delusional in believing that they can treat those who wronged them justly. The noble, freer person, “the active attacking , encroaching human is located 100 paces closer to justice for he has no need to appraise his object falsely as the reactive person does.” (934). Nietzsche covers the following sections with ample historical and textual evidence to support his claims (i.e. a long list in Section 13 detailing various reasons of punishments used throughout history etc.).
The final sections of the second treatise deal with rehashing his main ideas and bringing them to fruition. Nietzsche again dismisses punishment as the origin of the bad conscious and insists that it came about when man moved from living in the wild into civilization “under the sway of society and peace” (939). He elaborates by saying that in the wild men were happily adapted to “wilderness, war, roaming about, adventure” however when they entered into society, all of their instincts were “devalued and disconnected” (939). As men are animals, these instincts did not disappear, but according to Nietzsche were turned inward upon ourselves. Men created new wildernesses, new challenges to be overcome and now we wage a struggle between our natural impulses and adhering to the slave morality. The origin of bad conscious thus arises from this internalization all of the “hostility, cruelty, pleasure in persecution, in assault, in change, in destruction” (940). In section 17, Nietzsche postulates that this internalization was not voluntary, that the best interest and desire of the majority lay in the freedom of the wilderness, and settlement was not voluntary but forced by slave moralists. These agents of ressentiment he postulates acted with violent force and that the formed state “accordingly made its appearance as a terrible tyranny, as a crushing and ruthless machinery” (941). The notion of a social contract is therefore absurd in the Nietzschean model.
Having thus identified the hypothesized source of bad conscious, Nietzsche begins to chart its development through human society beginning in Section 19. In the earliest of days, tribes venerated their ancestors and held conviction that they owed a debt to them, eventually coming to see them as gods who must be appeased. However, the need to appease this debt is “continually growing, since these ancestors, in their continued existence as powerful spirits do no cease to use their strength to bestow new benefits on the clan,” (942). However as new religions sprang to life, it was the christian god that has inflicted the “maximum feelings of guilt” (943) upon mankind. Since the christian god holds us all in a debt we cannot possibly repay, Nietzsche argues that we invented the concepts of original sin and punishment for all. There is a very convenient escape from eternal punishment however, and Nietzsche calls this “christianity’s stroke of genius: God sacrificing himself for the guilt of man, God himself exacting payment of himself.” (944). He closes this line of thought by asking us to question the veracity of a creditor sacrificing himself for love of a debtor.
Nietzche ends his treatise by urging us to move ever forward. Despite his obvious preference for the noble past, he dismisses a return to such due to the loss of substance that would occur. He looks to the advent and evolution of a human who is vital and creative, loving and capable of contempt. Such a person would restore “the earth to its goal and man to his hope,” (946). Such a person would cast down the curses of nihilism and the need for religion.
Of all the philosophers we’ve studied, I’ve found Nietzsche to be at once the most frustrating, and rewarding to read. I hold much of what he says of the origins and evolutionary development of morality, justice, guilt, and consciousness to be highly relevant to any study of political thought. The creative forces which compel us to be better, the instinct to dominate and be vital are closer to the human experience than anything the other political commentators wrote.
QUESTIONS TO PONDER:
1). How would the “will to power” operate in a society in which the slave morality would held sway?
2). A sick man his entire life, Nietzsche is prone to assigning the label of good/noble/interesting to peoples and concepts which are active, vigorous, and aggressive. Can you find evidence of this in the text?
3). What is ressentiment? How does the hate of ressentiment differ from the contempt of the nobility?
4). What role(s) do deities play in the unfolding evolution of “bad conscious”?
5). What is the most primal of the human relationships? How has this shaped the “modern” conceptualization of punishment and justice?




